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The purpose of this paper is to examine
the nature, usefulness, and limitations of the
inspection of economic records as an arms
control technique. Although there has been
some discussion of records inspection in the
recent literature on arms control,2 further
study of the technique appears to be in
order.
The following discussion presumes some
broad arms limitation program, rather than
simply a nuclear test ban, and focuses on the
inspection of economic records as part of an
effort to verify adherence to (detect evasion
of) an agreement limiting weapons produc-
tion. The special problems involved in in-
specting different kinds of weapons produc-
tion-for example, aircraft, missiles, and
fissionable materials-are not considered.
Also, although it is assumed that records in-
spection would be part of an inspection
system involving various other inspection
techniques-such as, possibly, physical on-
site inspections, monitoring of the utilization
of scientific and technical personnel, trans-
portation monitoring, psychological inspec-
tion, aerial inspection, etc.-the relationship
of records inspection to each of these other
techniques is not examined in detail.
The first section of the paper considers
the nature and use of economic records
monitoring. The second reviews some of its
problems. The third offers some conclusions.
Nature and Use of Records Inspection
This section examines in turn the concept
of economic records, the nature of records
monitoring as an inspection technique, and
its relationship to other inspection tech-
niques.
CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC RECORDS
The concept of economic records used in
1 This paper was written while the author
was an Associate of the Russian Research Cen-
ter, Harvard University, on leave from the Uni-
versity of Michigan on a Ford Foundation fel-
lowship. The assistance of the Center and the
Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The
author is grateful to Holland Hunter, John
Teeple, Richard Cady, and Jeremy Stone for
valuable comments.
2 Philip Noel-Baker (1958, Chap. 40) sum-
marizes the findings of League of Nations ex-
perts in 1932-34 on budgetary inspection. The
original detailed studies contain material that is
still of interest. See League of Nations (1933,
Vols. I and II; 1935a, Vol. III; and 1935b).
Jesse Burkhead (1958, pp. 75-84) analyzes
the effectiveness of fiscal inspection of United
States government expenditures in verifying ad-
herence to an arms control agreement.
The inspection of production records is
examined in John B. Phelps (1961, pp. 104-
22).
Records inspection is also discussed, more
briefly, in Bernard T. Feld (1961) and Jerome
B. Wiesner (1961).
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this paper is a broad one. It includes records
( 1 ) which relate to all sectors of economic
activity (industry, mining, transportation,
etc.); (2) which are expressed in physical
or value (i.e., money) terms; (3) which per-
tain to various levels of economic organiza-
tion (shop, plant, enterprise, trust, regional
supervisory body, national administration);
and (4) which are available at centralized
records collection and storage centers or at
the individual record-keeping and reporting
units which originate the data.
This concept of records thus comprises,
for example, both the number of units pro-
duced by an individual plant and the total
size and composition of the budget of the
armed forces. Moreover, it includes not
only published information but also internal
data not customarily published (for one
reason or another). Finally, this concept far
exceeds the notion of inspecting merely pub-
lished (and perhaps at least some unpub-
lished) financial records relating to military
budgets.3
Economic records, so defined, clearly can
be of great significance for arms control in-
spection. Records in physical terms include,
for example, data on production, inventories,
shipments, and foreign trade; the location,
size, and characteristics of natural resources,
plants, equipment, laboratories, and other
facilities; and the size, composition (includ-
ing occupational skill), and location of the
labor force. Financial records in money
terms include both the budget and various
money flows outside the budget, such as
wage payments and inter-enterprise pay-
ments. However, to analyze and interpret
such money flow data, it is necessary to
have a full knowledge of the corresponding
prices, in order to ascertain accurately the
physical counterpart of a given financial
transaction. With changes in prices, the
commodity flows corresponding to a given
money payment would of course differ. For
this reason, records in physical terms are the
most useful for arms control.
The types of documents which constitute
the economic records pertinent to arms con-
trol include, for example, the following:
budgets, treasury disbursement forms, pro-
duction schedules, plan fulfillment reports,
allocation orders for scarce materials, price
handbooks, purchase orders, inventory rec-
ords, shop work orders, blueprints, shipping
orders, bank drafts, time cards, and person-
nel records.
NATURE OF RECORDS MONITORING
The essence of records monitoring as an
inspection technique consists of (1) locating
records pertinent to the activities covered in
the arms control agreement, and (2) verify-
ing their authenticity in order to establish
whether the inspectee is adhering to the
agreement.
It is clear that for both of these require-
ments the inspectorate must have a thor-
ough, highly detailed, and highly sophisti-
cated knowledge of the inspectee’s past and
present economic structure, organization,
and techniques, including not only such
aspects as record-keeping, accounting, and
statistical forms, practices, and procedures
but also its technology, production methods,
financial procedures, and transportation
practices-at least insofar as they relate to
activities to be inspected. Successful records
inspection therefore requires a team of
highly qualified specialists.
This is necessary in order to apply the
consistency test which is at the heart of
records inspection. The accuracy of re-
ported information on the use of materials,
production, inventories, deliveries, etc., can
be tested (although not verified absolutely)
3 The weaknesses of budgetary inspection, by
itself, have been pointed out by Burkhead
(1958) and need not be discussed here.
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by checking it for consistency with the ap-
propriate related data. For example, in at-
tempting to verify by records inspection the
reported production of a critical item (say,
missile engines or tank shells), inspectors
would analyze records pertaining to the in-
puts of components, manpower, equipment,
etc., into its production-in order to deter-
mine, taking the technology of production
(and allowances for rejects) into account,
whether reported output was consistent with
reported inputs. The inspectors would iden-
tify both the sources of supply and the cus-
tomers for a given enterprise, in order to
discover any changes in patterns of supply
and distribution. The purchase and sales
data of enterprises would also be compared
with transportation records, to establish that
quantities, sources, destinations, and dates
of shipment for specific transactions were
consistent.
If the inspectors had access to an appro-
priate quantity and variety of detailed data,
it would be both difficult and costly for the
inspectee to carry on the large-scale double
bookkeeping which would be necessary to
furnish a convincing set of internally con-
sistent false data. For example, it would be
much easier for an inspectee to deceive the
inspectors if the latter were limited to exam-
ining rather aggregative budget appropria-
tion and expenditure records at the national
headquarters of the ministry of finance, than
if the latter had access as well to such addi-
tional information as (1) central records
concerning materials allocation, investment,
and manpower, and (2) individual plant
records concerning these and other aspects
of production. The reliability which may be
attached to the consistency test therefore de-
pends on the access of the inspectors (mea-
sured in quantity, variety, and degree of de-
tail of records), as well as on their qualifica-
tions to analyze the records.
In this connection, the importance of ac-
cess to past records should be recognized.
Access to past records is very important in
assessing the consistency of current records.
Furthermore, it would add to the difficulty
and cost of falsification if the process had to
include past records as well as current ones.
First, past records provide necessary per-
spective for assessing the data in records for
subsequent periods. Records for past periods,
moreover, are likely to be especially useful
in the effort to discover any facilities in
existence when the arms control agreement
is signed (or enters into force) which are
hidden rather than declared. Second, the
burden of falsification is increased precisely
because it is true that different relationships
must have prevailed in the past in regard to
production patterns, commodity flows, in-
ventory ratios, input coefficients, technologi-
cal processes, etc. In order to falsify past
records convincingly, it would be necessary
for the inspectee to simulate for each past
period an entire economy with a different
structure. This structure, moreover, would
have to be both (1) internally consistent for
the given time period and (2) consistent
over time with the structures of the preced-
ing and following periods. Assuming access
on the part of the inspectorate to the appro-
priate records, the task of meeting these re-
quirements would be immense.
It appears that records monitoring could
play a useful part in the effort to discover
clandestine production in undeclared facili-
ties as well as in declared facilities. The
basic approach would be the same in both
cases-to disclose discrepancies and incon-
sistencies which suggested a failure to com-
ply with the terms of the arms control agree-
ment.
In the case of declared facilities, inspec-
tion of records pertaining to production, ma-
terials use, transportation, etc., would seek
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to verify that the reported production rate-
presumably equal to or less than that speci-
fied in the agreement-was indeed the true
one, by identifying any discrepancies between
the inputs used and the specified output.
In the case of undeclared facilities, the
task would be to determine their existence
and, if possible, location and activities.
Records inspection could provide clues to
the existence of undeclared facilities by dis-
closing evidence regarding construction, the
use of transportation services, unaccounted
for residuals in the use of critical materials,
etc.
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER INSPECTION
TECHNIQUES
It seems clear that records inspection
could not be sufficient by itself. Rather, it
would have to be part of an inspection sys-
tem in which other techniques were also
used which could (1) support records in-
spection and (2) investigate further the clues
provided by records inspection.
1. As noted above, at the heart of rec-
ords inspection is the consistency test. How-
ever, it would not be sufficient merely to
establish that all of the appropriate records
were mutually consistent. It would be neces-
sary in addition to establish that these mutu-
ally consistent records in fact depicted real-
ity, by conducting selected physical (on-
site) inspections to verify the authenticity of
selected records. For example, plant inspec-
tions could verify the accuracy of records
regarding equipment, inventories, etc. Such
selective physical inspection, on a random
sample basis, would establish the accuracy
of individual records, from which the reli-
ability of other records, found to be con-
sistent with them, would be inferred.
2. Likewise, physical and other inspec-
tion techniques, included in the over-all in-
spection system, would be used to follow up
any evidence provided by records inspection
that there was, or might be, clandestine
production in declared or undeclared facili-
ties.
These two instances suggest the comple-
mentarity which exists between records
monitoring and other inspection techniques.
At the same time, it is true that, to some
degree at least, records monitoring can be a
substitute for other types of inspection. For
example, more extensive records inspection
could reduce (but not to zero) the amount
of on-site physical inspection needed to
monitor satisfactorily a declared facility or
to search for undeclared facilities. Such a
trade-off between types of inspection, for a
given task, must be considered in designing
alternative inspection systems.
Problems of Records Inspection
The preceding discussion has indicated
that records inspection can play a useful
role, in conjunction with other inspection
techniques, in enforcing an arms control
agreement. However, there are a number of
problems and unresolved questions concern-
ing records monitoring, of which three will
be discussed below. They are (1) the quan-
tity and kind of economic records available
which might be inspected; (2) the extent of
access to them; and (3) the capability of
records monitoring to detect violations and
the cost of a &dquo;successful&dquo; records monitor-
ing program.
AVAILABILITY OF RECORDS
This problem involves such questions as
the following: Are the necessary detailed
records kept? Where are they located-only
at the individual enterprise, or also at one
or more central organizations, such as the
ministry of defense, the ministry of finance,
the state planning commission, etc.? Are
they in a convenient form for inspection.
purposes, for example, punched cards for
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automatic data-processing equipment rather
than typewritten or even handwritten ledgers?
A preliminary examination of record-
keeping practices in the U.S.S.R. and the
United States suggests that it should not be
excessively difficult, from a technical stand-
point, to design a records monitoring pro-
gram which could be applied to these two
countries, and to others as well.
Despite marked differences between the
U.S.S.R. and the United States in regard to
the goals, organization, and control of their
economies, there are a number of similarities
in regard to economic records.4 In general,
United States budgetary, banking, produc-
tion, and transportation documents have
their approximate counterparts in the Soviet
economy, although their specific features
(i.e., the precise information on the forms)
may differ somewhat, reflecting institu-
tional differences. This is, of course, what
one would expect, given that both nations
have large, complex industrialized economies
with similar problems-and records-in
organizing and controlling transfers of goods
and funds among enterprises, within enter-
prises, and between the treasury and enter-
prises.
This similarity is attributable in large part
to the fact that Soviet industrial enterprises
are organized and operated on a basis of
khozraschet (literally, &dquo;economic calcula-
tion&dquo;). Under this arrangement, an enter-
prise has its own fixed and working capital
and bank account; buys materials and com-
ponents from other enterprises and sells its
product to other enterprises (or, in the case
of military production, to the armed forces)
on the basis of state supply plans and con-
tracts ; hires its workers; and is supposed to
earn enough sales revenue to cover current
(i.e., noncapital) expenditures and show a
profit. It receives budget grants only for
investment and for certain kinds of opera-
tional expenditures, including some research
and development activities.
The similarities between the Soviet and
United States economies are greatest in those
sectors, such as the development and pro-
duction of strategic delivery vehicles, in
which the armed forces constitute the final
consumer. In the United States, govern-
ment planning and control are, necessarily,
predominant in these sectors, in contrast to
most of the rest of the economy, where the
government’s role is much less direct and
specific.
There are, however, a number of differ-
ences between Soviet and United States
economic records which stem from the basic
differences in the nature of their economic
systems. A much greater proportion of the
total existing economic data is available at
statistical and other governmental agencies
in the U.S.S.R. than in the United States. In
the U.S.S.R., the data collected at the center
are the result of a comprehensive census of
the corresponding activity, which is con-
ducted as part of the process of economic
administration and control. In contrast, in
the United States, where the role of the gov-
ernment in the economy is much smaller
and much less specific, official statistics are
obtained by sampling methods to a much
larger extent than in the U.S.S.R. While the
census method does not necessarily imply
(significantly) greater accuracy, it does
mean that a greater amount of information
about individual enterprises is available at
the center-and at the various intervening
levels. In addition, in the U.S.S.R. there are
control channels, with economic records of
interest for arms control, which have no
counterpart in the United States-for exam-
4 On Soviet economic records, see Gregory
Grossman (1960), Murray Feshbach (1960 and
1962) , and Robert W. Campbell (1962).
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ple, the State Planning Committee and the
State Bank.
Another difference concerns the coverage
of the national budget in the two countries.
The budget embraces a much larger share of
total economic activity in the U.S.S.R. than
in the United States-although in both coun-
tries many transactions and commodity flows
significant for arms control are outside
budget and treasury operations. One reason
for the difference between the two coun-
tries in the importance of the budget is that
a larger share of total resources is diverted,
through budget revenues and expenditures,
from household consumption to government
investment and military programs in the
U.S.S.R. than in the United States. Also,
the Soviet national budget is a consolidated
budget which subsumes the budgets of lower
levels of government, such as the republics,
oblasts, etc., while the United States federal
budget does not include all of our state and
local budgets.
The question is sometimes raised as to
how useful Soviet economic records would
be for arms control purposes, in view of
evidence in the Soviet press and in the
speeches of Soviet leaders that falsification
of economic records and statistics is not un-
common in the U.S.S.R. The issue here is
not whether the statistical data published by
Soviet statistical agencies are accurate and
trustworthy, but rather whether the under-
lying internal data received by these agencies
and other supervisory organs from subordi-
nate organizations are accurate. Thus, while
there are many reasons for questioning pub-
lished Soviet data as incomplete, ambiguous,
misleading, or otherwise distorted, serious
shortcomings in the published data need not
impede a records monitoring program which
would in any case be concerned with de-
tailed internal, operational records.
As far as the internal, operational records
are concerned, it is clear that enterprises,
and regional authorities as well, do have
strong reasons for filing false reports. There
is a powerful incentive to overstate output-
and also to file false reports about cost,
quality, and commodity assortment (product
mix)-in order to simulate fulfillment and
overfulfillment of ambitious and often un-
realistic production assignments for the en-
terprise and for the region. On the other
hand, the various supervisory and control
organs in the Soviet economy are keenly
aware of this tendency and make a vigorous
and continuous effort to combat it. It is
to be expected that these efforts to combat
falsification have been and are much more
successful in closely supervised, high-prior-
ity, military-oriented activities than in, say,
agriculture, where for various reasons suc-
cessful (for a time at least) falsification is
more easily accomplished. Hence, the in-
ternal records of interest for the purpose of
arms control inspection are likely to be suf-
ficiently reliable to justify a records moni-
toring program.
Although record-keeping is highly devel-
oped in both the U.S.S.R. and the United
States, most of the record-keeping is not de-
voted primarily to establishing the kind of
detailed input-output relationships of inter-
est to a records monitoring program for
arms control purposes. For example, most
business record-keeping in the United States,
particularly at more aggregative levels of the
enterprise, is for tax and other financial pur-
poses and is primarily in value rather than
physical terms. In the U.S.S.R., in contrast,
a relatively greater share of record-keeping
is devoted to the kind of relationships of
interest to a records monitoring program.
In the centrally planned and administered
Soviet economy, the control authorities rely
primarily upon detailed, specific instructions,
commonly stated in physical rather than (or
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as well as) value terms, to direct and regu-
late economic activity. Thus, for example,
input coefficients (&dquo;norms&dquo;) are specified
as part of the planning process, and produc-
tion results are examined to ascertain adher-
ence to these norms.
Nevertheless, in the U.S.S.R., as well as
in the United States, it is likely that addi-
tional record-keeping would be required to
furnish the kind of detailed information
which would be necessary for an effective
records monitoring program. Moreover, an
international inspectorate might wish to have
all of the inspectee countries adopt uniform
record-keeping procedures (forms, reporting
schedules, etc.) in order to facilitate the
training and assignment of inspectors, to
avoid the appearance of &dquo;discrimination&dquo;
against one inspectee, etc. Thus, adoption
of a records monitoring program as part of
an inspection system would require addi-
tional record-keeping on the part of inspec-
tee countries. This would be one of the
° 
many costs involved in the country’s adher-
ence to an arms control agreement.
To avoid being swamped by a mass of
records-which by their volume and com-
plexity would provide opportunities for con-
cealing violations-the inspectorate would
want to minimize the scope of its records
monitoring, focusing it on selected records
concerning activities of prime concern. In
general, it appears desirable for the inspec-
torate to concentrate on a close examination
of detailed records for a limited range of
activities, rather than to monitor more
loosely more aggregate records on a wider
range of activities.
For this purpose it is essential to identify
a minimum number of &dquo;critical&dquo; items es-
pecially characteristic of the weapons
covered by the agreement (e.g., rocket en-
gines, guidance systems, etc.), and to relate
the intensity of inspection to the &dquo;critical-
ness&dquo; of the item. Records of activities
directly pertinent to the production of criti-
cal items would be most closely inspected.
Records regarding less critical items (or less
directly related to the production of more
critical items) would be inspected less
thoroughly. Records of activities not involv-
ing critical items would be ignored.
The records monitoring program might
thus consist of ( 1 ) regular and detailed
monitoring of selected key records, (2)
random sample inspection of selected other
records, (3) random sample on-site inspec-
tions to confirm the accuracy of records,
and (4) follow-up on-site inspections to
investigate apparent violations suggested by
discrepancies in the records. Such a pro-
gram of records monitoring would keep
down the amount of records inspection, as
well as its cost.
ACCESS
Even a selective inspection program of
the scope suggested may require a greater
amount of access to the inspectee’s economy
(and society) than some countries, notably
the Soviet Union, are willing to grant.
The basic opposition of the Soviet Union
to inspection is well known. In general, it
rests on the Soviet regime’s desire to keep
its &dquo;closed&dquo; society insulated from the dis-
turbing effects of foreign influences. More
specifically, the Soviets believe that inspec-
tion (including records inspection) intended
to detect violations of an arms control agree-
ment inevitably would also reveal much in-
formation not bearing directly on the en-
forcement of the agreement which they wish
to conceal. This includes both &dquo;strategic&dquo;
information, such as the location and devel-
opment of industrial facilities, and &dquo;non-
strategic&dquo; information which the Soviet
government nevertheless regards as &dquo;sensi-
tive,&dquo; such as data on wages and prices
which reveal facts about the standard of
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living and the distribution of income. The
Soviet regime considers disclosure of such
information harmful to its position in the
&dquo;peaceful competition&dquo; between it and the
West which it contemplates would continue
even after the conclusion of an arms control
agreement.
Dougherty has summarized the Soviet
position on inspection as follows:
It is not surprising, then, that although the
Soviets have expressed a willingness in their
more comprehensive disarmament plans to pro-
pose the establishment of ground control posts
at large ports, airfields, railway junctions and
along main motor highways (all of which in the
U.S.S.R. would add up to only a few dozen
fixed locations), they have always shied away
from the notion of uninhibited access by mobile
inspection teams. Within the United Nations
Disarmament Commission, after accepting in
principle the verification of agreed arms reduc-
tions by an international inspectorate, the
Soviets later interpreted this to mean nothing
more than inspection of &dquo;declared facilities.&dquo;
Thus the Soviets would allow the inspectors to
examine the actual sites where military forces
had supposedly been deactivated and military
installations had supposedly been dismantled.
But they would not allow the inspectors to
roam freely throughout the country to make
sure that the forces had not been moved to an-
other location or that the weapons systems had
not been reassembled and emplaced elsewhere
[Dougherty, 1961, p. 356].
The most recent Soviet proposal, in its
&dquo;Draft Treaty on General and Complete
Disarmament Under Strict International
Control,&dquo; submitted to the Eighteen Nation
Committee on Disarmament on March 15,
1962, takes essentially this approach toward
inspection. As far as records inspection is
concerned, it mentions only financial in-
spection of budgetary allocations,5 the limi-
tations of which are by now generally
recognized.
Even in the case of the United States,
whose disarmament proposals have empha-
sized the necessity of inspection, there are
serious consitutional and other legal barriers
to the invasion of personal and business
privacy which records inspection (and other
kinds of inspection) would represent.6
RELIABILITY AND COST
As in the case of other inspection tech-
niques, there are as yet no really satisfactory
estimates-so far as I have been able to
discover-of (1) the probable reliability and
(2) the likely cost of a records monitoring
program.7 7
We do not yet know with any precision-
for each of the various weapons systems
likely to be covered under an arms control
agreement-the answers to such questions as
the following: Just what records would have
to be inspected? What specific consistency
tests would be used? To what extent would
other kinds of inspection, such as physical
on-site inspections, be needed to support
records inspection? What is the relationship
between the kinds of records inspected and
the qualifications of the inspection team,
5 Art. 13, Par. 2: "The International Dis-
armament Organization shall verify the imple-
mentation of the measures referred to in Para-
graph 1 of this Article [reduction of military
expenditures during the first stage of disarma-
ment] through its financial inspectors, to whom
the States parties to the Treaty undertake to
grant unhindered access to the records of cen-
tral financial offices concerning the reduction
of the budgetary allocations of States in connec-
tion with the elimination of the means of de-
livering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of
foreign military bases and the reduction of
armed forces and conventional armaments, in-
cluding the relevant decisions of their legisla-
tive and executive bodies on this subject."
(Emphasis added.)
Similar provisions apply to the second stage
(Art. 26, Par. 2) and the third stage (Art. 35,
Par. 2).
6 See Louis Henkin (1958).
7 Some rough, illustrative calculations are
given in Phelps (1961, pp. 116-19 ) .
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on the one hand, and the probability of
detecting evasion, on the other? How diffi-
cult would it be for a potential evader to
falsify records successfully?
It appears doubtful that sufficiently reli-
able answers to these questions can be found
simply by consulting the opinion of experts
regarding each of the various weapons sys-
tems. Rather, further research seems desir-
able, along the following lines. ( 1 ) Detailed
information should be collected on the rec-
ords used in the production of each of the
principal weapons systems (both in the
United States, and, to the extent possible,
also in the U.S.S.R.). (2) It would then
be possible, at least in a preliminary way,
to determine the specific records required
for inspection and to design various inspec-
tion techniques, such as consistency checks
of specific records, sample verification of
selected records by on-site inspections, etc.
(3) Tests should be carried out to apply these
techniques to the actual records of an enter-
prise engaged in weapons production. (4)
Data requirements and inspection techniques
would then be modified on the basis of the
results of these tests. (5) Finally, games
should be conducted to determine the effec-
tiveness of records monitoring-with various
combinations of records inspection tech-
niques and inspection personnel-in detect-
ing various hypothetical cases of undeclared
production. They would be conducted by a
group of specialists possessing the appropri-
ate kinds of expertise, including auditors,
engineers, scientists, and others familiar with
United States and Soviet practices in the
production of different weapons systems. At
some advanced stage, it would probably be
desirable to have an evasion game with a
team of evaders composed of Soviet defectors
and German scientists formerly engaged in
Soviet missile and nuclear production.
On the basis of such games, an assessment
could then be made of the potential effec-
tiveness and limitations of records monitor-
ing as an inspection technique-and as part
of an inspection system, or of alternative
systems involving different combinations of
several inspection techniques. The require-
ments of records monitoring in terms of the
number and kind of personnel, equipment,
travel, etc., and their cost could then be
estimated for alternative records monitor-
ing programs.
Conclusions
The preceding discussion suggests that
records monitoring can play a useful role
in an arms control inspection system, com-
plementing or substituting for other inspec-
tion techniques. There are, however, at
least two important reasons for limiting the
scope of a records inspection program. On
the one hand, it is necessary to avoid the
danger of the inspectorate being swamped
by a flow of records which by its volume
and complexity makes detection of evasion
more difficult. On the other hand, limitation
of inspection reduces the amount of access
demanded of the inspectee-a major consid-
eration in negotiating with the Soviet Union
on arms control.
As yet we do not have a precise idea of
the effectiveness of different records moni-
toring programs in detecting evasion, or of
the corresponding requirements in man-
power and equipment and their costs. To
secure this information, as a basis for deter-
mining the appropriate role for records
monitoring in alternative arms control in-
spection systems, further research is sug-
gested.
